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1 Introduction
In recent years, the economic analysis of law has developed from a
small sideline known to only very few specialists into a large subdisci-
pline of economics. Due to its applied character, economic analysts of
law can exert an immediate influence on current decision-making, and
it is therefore not surprising that leading practitioners in the field re-
gularly surface in the news. Perhaps the most recent example was the
role the mediator Judge Richard Posner, one of the leading practitio-
ners of law and economics, had played in the Microsoft case. The recent
appearance of several textbooks, handbooks, encyclopaedias and an-
thologies is a further sign of the consolidation of the field of law and
economics (Backhaus, 1999 a).
The European process of market integration with its dual dimen-
sion of integrating further and more markets and integrating them also
more deeply in terms of removing barriers and harmonizing the legal
framework in which market exchange takes place has somewhat sur-
prisingly given law and economics an additional function. This function
consists in two aspects. On the one hand, different legal traditions need
to be merged in terms of common principles. Here, economic analysis
can provide the framework of principles and thereby assumes a norma-
tive quality. A fine example is the principle of subsidiarity (Backhaus,
1999 b). On the other hand, European institutions such as the Com-
mission actively intervene in economic areas, such as specific markets
on the basis of economic theory. The recent initiatives of the Commis-
sioner for competition form a good example (see Backhaus & Hansen,
2000), since the choice of theory also informs the political action that
needs to be taken. In such a case, the result of the analysis determines
the competences of different political actors.
Economic analyses are needed for a variety of different applica-
tions. Their format will therefore differ according to the application for
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which they are needed. In this ”how-to” guide, first a survey over the
most important applications is offered and a discussion follows of the
steps necessary for an economic analysis of a legal problem at a pro-
fessionally acceptable level.
2 Three Types of Analysis
In principle there are three different kinds of analysis :
1. an evaluative analysis
2. a positive analysis of legal structures (economic reconstruction of
legal argument)
3. a normative (welfare) economic analysis.
These three types differ in the economic method and approach to
the problem. An evaluative analysis tries to analyse, on the basis of an
economic model, the consequences of a particular legal decision or set
of decisions or else an act. A positive analysis aiming at reconstruc-
ting the structure of a legal argument or doctrine aims at illuminating
complex legal reasoning that cannot be reduced to one or a few orga-
nizing principles of legal doctrine. Hence a legal theory is substituted
by an economic theory. While these first two types of analysis differ
in their level of abstraction, they both belong to the realm of positive
(and therefore not normative) analysis. This implies that the analytical
conclusions are in principle testable and therefore need to be presen-
ted in a testable form. Although it will not always be possible to run
empirical tests for all the relevant conclusions of an economic analysis,
an appropriate test procedure and the relevant data sources should be
indicated side by side with a statement indicating which test results
would refute the analytical conclusion.
A normative (welfare) economic analysis is different. Its purpose
is to distil normative conclusions from a limited set of value judgments.
Since legal reasoning is based on value judgments, the task of the eco-
nomist is to explore the relationship between the various value judg-
ments underlying legal discourse and to indicate where and how they
may conflict. If i.e. a particular value judgment is to be given precedence
over others, the normative economic analysis can show to what extent
this priority will compromise attainment of other traditional goals. In
this case, the economist tries to give expression to lawyers’ values to
their fullest possible extent.
Since this exercise is actually a sophisticated tool of good lawye-
ring and thus by necessity decision oriented and normative, it does not
lead to testable applications. Whether the analysis is correct or not, can
still be ascertained by testing its logic.
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3 Different Applications
The first distinction concerns the economic method or approach. A se-
cond distinction refers to the different uses of legal economic analysis.
Economic analyses of legal problems are used in vastly different con-
texts. In court cases, economic experts have traditionally played a role
when specifically economic expertise (such as the likely effects of mer-
gers) was required. With the expansion of law and economics as a sub-
discipline to virtually every aspect of legal applications, the economist’s
role has likewise become a broader one. The scope of a legal economic
analysis of a court expert will depend on whether the expertise is re-
quired for elucidating the particulars of a single case or whether an
assessment of the likely consequences of setting precedent is called
for. In the first case, the application of received economic knowledge
and exercise of standard techniques is normally sufficient, whereas in
the second case a model may have to be developed (and tested).
A legal economic analysis plays an important part in adminis-
trative applications as well. Again, there is a substantial distinction
between the analysis of the application of a specific rule to a particular
case or whether the impact of the rule on all the cases to which it is
applied has to be analysed. Again, in the second case an explicit model
will have to be constructed.
The most genuine applications of an economic analysis to legal
problems occur at the legislative level. Since at this level we will nor-
mally observe a competition between different proposals the task of the
economist is to sort out which respects of the differences between them
are economically relevant. Hopefully, a single model of relevance can
be developed that encompasses the competing proposals. The broader
the impact of the legislation under consideration, the more through
hypothesis testing will be required.
4 General Guidelines
Apart from the differences between these various types of analytical
approaches to be discussed shortly, there are six recommendations
which should be heeded in any event.
1. The purposes of a particular decision or rule need be strictly dif-
ferentiated from the outcomes of that decision or rule. A frequent
misunderstanding grows out of the assumption that the two coin-
cide, and it is often the task of the economist to show how and why
they do not.
2. The economic analysis must be kept pure in the sense that no addi-
tional assumptions not contained in the model must enter. In parti-
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cular, the theoretical model must be kept separate from the empirical
base.
3. The economic analysis of a particular legal rule or decision must
not be kept to the confines of that rule; very often, there are con-
sequences going beyond the area to which the rule or decision was
meant to apply. These wider consequences may actually be more
important than the narrower and intended ones. It is the task of the
economic analyst to render as complete a picture as possible.
4. At every step the analysis should be kept empirically open in the
sense that empirical knowledge that is or might be available can be
systematically introduced.
5. Legal rules and decisions have to be analysed in terms of whose
decision-making they are able to affect. Economics is a science about
decisions taken by agents, and the consequences of legal decision-
making are the composites of those decisions with respect to rule
making. The legal economic analysis can only be institutionally re-
levant if the deciding actors have been correctly identified.
6. Finally, the economic analyst, in presenting his results, needs to
keep in mind how much and which information his lawyer counter-
parts are able to digest and work with. A careful process of transla-
ting and simplifying without falsifying may be necessary.
5 Preliminary Steps
Step 1 Define the problem to be analysed and state what types of ans-
wers can be expected.
Step 2 Disassemble the problem and reduce it to a sequence of legal
questions with as small a residue as possible (see step 4).
Step 3 Make every legal problem correspond to an appropriate set of
legal norms and indicate the norms.
Step 4 (the residue) Now structure the residue.
a) List all the questions of fact and indicate the most appropriate
method for establishing these facts.
b) List all the questions of theory, state the questions precisely
in terms of and side by side with the appropriate theory or
theories to be invoked.
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6 Analytical Steps
Step 1 State the basic problem in economic terms, develop one uni-
fying model of reference and indicate the iterative steps needed
to develop the model in several variations until it fits the pro-
blem at hand. State the possible outcomes of your model-based
analysis.
Step 2 Select and list the norms and legal terms the interpretation of
which will be critical to the outcome of the analysis and give
an economic analysis one by one. You must precisely state the
theory which you use for this analysis and ensure that the pre-
mises remain the same as in the general model of reference.
Step 3 List the solutions (of step 2) and translate them into the lan-
guage of the legal norms. Draw the conclusions.
Step 4 Now carry through the analysis as a whole by using the model
developed in step 1 and the interpretative results from step 3.
State the outcome.
7 Model Variations and Sensivity Analysis
The four steps of part 6 may have to be repeated for the main alterna-
tives under consideration.
Step 1 Try to incorporate the main variations of the conclusions (6.4)
into the same model and discuss the outcomes.
Step 2 Highlight the critical assumptions on which the solution de-
pends.
Step 3 Ascertain whether the model is robust with respect to those as-
sumptions and, if it is not, indicate precisely where the model
applies.
Step 4 Give a survey of the most important competing models not used
in this analysis and indicate the reasons for your preference. If
that preference is only slight, you may have to repeat the ana-
lysis in terms of the second best model.
Step 5 Translate the results of your analysis and the main steps by
which it came about into legal terms.
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8 Specific Observations
A couple of observations apply specifically to the different approaches
and uses.
Evaluative Positive Normative Analysis
Applications
1 2 3 Courts
4 5 6 Administr.
7 8 9 Legislative
1. Most of the analyses needed in court situations are straightforward
applications of economic techniques. Here, reliance on empirical
data is particularly called for. Since the expert is brought in to help
determine the case one way or the others, he should expect to be con-
fronted with a counter expert. Critical assumptions of the economic
analysis are eagerly picked up by lawyers, particularly in adversary
procedures. This tends to confuse all parties involved, including the
judges. Therefore, one has to be careful to avoid jargon and to state
assumptions and conclusions in clear terms. The model itself should
be kept basic.
2. When trying to reconstruct involved court decisions in terms of po-
sitive economic theory- this is the art Judge Posner has developed
to mastery- it is important to trace the roots of the conflicting as-
pects of court decisions. The conflicting outcomes may result from
any one of the following causes :
a) Faulty reasoning (unlikely in high court decisions) (but see Tul-
lock, 1994)
b) Implicit factual assumptions that have to be brought to the sur-
face and proven correct or incorrect.
c) Incorrect use of non-legal terms
d) The incorrect generalizations from non-legal theories
e) Uncertainty of the courts about the likely outcomes of their deci-
sions.
f) Conflicting intentions of traditional decision-making.
For the economic analyst it is important to pinpoint one or several
of these problems and focus on their resolution. The results of the
economic analysis will be become to the court decision makers as long
as they clearly improve upon their lawyering. The judicial intentions
have to be clearly formulated and need to enter the analysis. Much
of the opposition to the economic analysis of legal problems such as
Posner’s stems not so much from an aversion to economic analytical
techniques as from a sense that the economic analysis is a Trojan horse
carrying ideological value judgments not shared by the court.
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3. Welfare economic analyses often revolve around highly technical
questions that can have important consequences. An example is the
proper choice of a discount rate in compensation cases. The eco-
nomic analyst should be aware of these arguments and state them
explicitly in his brief while not relying excessively on dubious as-
sumptions (see part 7 above).
4. In administrative decisions typically more time is allowed to prepare
an argument. Therefore the level of sophistication can be substan-
tially higher. This will in particular refer to the empirical corrobo-
ration of the analysis. The administrative agency may actually be
helpful and assist in data gathering and processing.
5. When attempting to reconstruct in economic terms a whole set of
legal norms such as an administrative decree or an act, the analyst
should determine what shaped the act and its current interpreta-
tion and implementation. It is unrealistic to assume that an econo-
mic analysis can bring about a change in either the act itself or its
interpretation or its implementation if that change runs counter to
the intentions of powerful pressure groups. It is not the task of the
economist to change the political balance. The economist has to take
the political status quo as given and try to improve upon it in the Pa-
reto sense. Hence, a political economic analysis of the legal norms
under consideration is likely to be necessary. This does not mean
that the economic analyst should skirt the difficult ”political” or dis-
tributive issues. It is quite appropriate and sometimes welcome to
elucidate distributive consequences of alternative decisions side by
side with the emphasis on allocation. Only where one alternative is
clearly superior to the other in the Pareto sense should the economic
analyst make this judgment, and explicitly so.
6. In some administrative procedures, explicit normative economic
analyses are called for. When i.e. environmental impact statements
are required, the analytical techniques used should be clearly des-
cribed. Confusion about those techniques can lead to a perversion
of their results.
7. There is no doubt that the economic analyst can play a role of the
greatest importance in the legislative arena. Economics is most use-
ful when applied to a large number of similar cases, and this is the
case when a piece of legislation is to be enacted. Since most legisla-
tion is controversial, the economic analyst should try to stay outside
the political turbulences while being aware of the different pressures
involved. Nothing hurts the standing of an economic analyst more
than being involved in a heated discussion with another economic
analyst in public. Questions of economic methodology cannot al-
ways be resolved. They can never be resolved in the political arena.
In order to be successful, it is important to stress the areas of agree-
ment among economists and state but not controversially discuss
the points of disagreement. In an evaluative analysis of this kind,
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heavy reliance on empirical techniques with large databases is par-
ticularly useful. The economic analyst who is also politically involved
should state clearly where the analysis ends and the political per-
suasions begin.
8. When analysing legislative proposals or laws that have to be passed
or may have to be amended, the economic analyst should keep in
mind that the impact of a law begins much earlier than the date at
which it gets passed. The more important the legislation is, the more
forceful will be the reactions to it before its enactment. The economic
analyst should therefore try to construct a model which takes into
account the likely reactions of those affected by the law; and spell
out the consequences of alternative proposals in these terms. Far-
reaching legislative proposals often have consequences even if they
are not enacted. In order to avoid such unintended consequences,
it is wise and makes economic sense to provide for loopholes and
clauses allowing to opt out of the provisions of the law. Often the
distributive consequences of particular pieces of legislation foster
so much opposition that a well thought out and balanced piece of
legislation cannot be passed. In that case a long transition period
and an effective date pushed far into the future can prove to be an
attractive solution (see Frey, 1983, p. 29).
9. In the legislative process, the economic analyst can play an impor-
tant and helpful role by spelling out the implications of different
political persuasions. In this way, deadlocked committees can so-
metimes be gotten moving again. In order to make welfare economic
analyses useful for these applications, it is important to translate
them into plain day-to-day language.
10. A short guide to the literature. A legal economic analysis which
follows roughly the approach outlined above can be found in Back-
haus 1987, a book which gives a legal-economic analysis of one
court case. The classical works in law and economics are, of course,
Calabresi 1970 which he followed up with Calabresi and Bobbitt
1978 as well as Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law, (third edition
1986). An alternative institutionalist approach can be found in Sa-
muels and Schmid 1981. Texts commonly used at American uni-
versities include Polinsky 1983 and Shavell 1987. The text by Ogus
and Veljanovski (1984) offers a collection of relevant readings, and
widely used although somewhat opaque is Veljanovski 1982. Most
texts de-emphasize procedural law, but Tullock 1980 is a notable
exception. His book is particularly accessible to the non-economist.
An excellent case study is Reuter 1983 which has meanwhile ap-
peared in a student edition. While most of the literature is in En-
glish, the German literature is also extensive, most of which is quo-
ted in Adams 1985 and Backhaus 1987. The most important jour-
nals in the field are The Journal of Law and Economics. The
Journal of Legal Studies, The Journal of Law, Economics and
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Organization,The International Review of Law and Economics, and
last, but not least, The European Journal of Law and Economics.
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Résumé
Le processus d’intégration européenne doit faire face aux incompatibi-
lités possibles entre des règles issues de sources différentes. L’analyse
économique permet de dépasser ces frictions. Cet article propose un
certain nombre de règles montant comment l’économiste peut remplir
son rôle sans se substituer aux autorités législatives et juridiques.
Abstract
The process of European integration leads to further and deeper dif-
ferentiation of legal rules stemming from different sources. Frictions
and incompatibilities between these legal rules need to be overcome,
and economic analyses can serve towards this purpose. This paper
tries to develop guidelines on how the economic analyst can fulfil his
role without replacing those endowed with legislative or jurisdictional
authority.
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